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Sunday, November 24, 2013

Technological Wisdom


Technological Wisdom

As we use information technologies, “we develop the cognitive skills best suited for them and neglect those capacities that are less well matched,” Kanner writes. “We mold ourselves to the machine.” Credit: Creative Commons/Keoni Cabral.


Human beings are destined to mold the Earth. Gifted with exquisite hands, passionate imaginations, and boundless curiosity about how things work, we need to tinker, prod, poke, and build. It is in our genes, and our souls, to engage so completely with our physical surroundings that we alter them, just as the abundant fertility of the planet could not help but produce us. Indeed, our propensity to construct and redo may be a flamboyant expression of the generativity of our evolving world, which in its four-and-a-half-billion-year history has never ceased to cast itself anew.

To be against technology is to deny a crucial part of human nature. Today, however, it has become extremely difficult to fully appreciate or ponder our ability to make things. Instead, we are caught in a tragically flawed philosophy called “technological progress” that blinds us to the numerous choices we have, the various ways open to us to become both wise and creative technological beings. It is as if we had decided that the only proper use of our legs is to run, and run as hard as we can, at every possible moment.

At present, our modern machines are polluting the Earth, increasing the pace and stress of daily life, and transforming our environment faster than we can comprehend. We are experiencing one wave of future shock after another and cannot seem to slow down long enough to figure out why. We can only have faith that the next set of advances—nanotechnology, bioengineering, virtual reality—will magically save us.

As an ecopsychologist, I am interested in the personal relationships we each have with the natural and built worlds and how these relationships interact. Our many inventions and devices are not only altering the face of the planet, but also radically changing our connection to nature, to each other, and to ourselves. These are profound changes worthy of our most serious attention.

Yet at present there is no “psychology of technology,” if by this we mean a systematic examination of the myriad influences of each innovation on our psyches, our relationships, our identities. This is a curious state of affairs, especially since psychology has turned its magnifying glass onto so many other aspects of our lives. But my profession is itself caught up in the sweep of technological progress and assumes that each “advancement” is ultimately positive, inevitable, or both.

An alternative view, and one that ushers in the full psychological complexity of technology, conceives of our capacity to mold the Earth as engaging in a two-way relationship. As we enter into this relationship, we will be transformed. In this act of transformation, certain questions emerge. What happens to us, and the world, when we do not try to build it up as fast as possible? What happens when we do? Is there such a thing as technological walking, skipping, strolling, and meandering, as well as running, and how do our experience and treatment of our selves and surroundings differ in each of these modes?

In this article, I will offer a relational theory of technology, one that begins to recognize fully the mutual influence of humans and their inventions. The implications of such a theory will be examined for two areas, one that already exists and is well established (health psychology), and one that—surprisingly enough given its import—is only in its infancy: the psychology of information technology. We will also see that honoring the mutual influence between humans and their creations involves far more than the necessary move to sustainable or appropriate technology. It requires a shift from technological progress to technological wisdom.

The Illusion of Neutrality


Physics, ecology, and the various religious and wisdom traditions of the world all tell us that we are interdependent, that we inhabit a web of existence in which our actions ripple out in multiple directions, only to reverberate back to us over time as complex configurations that can never be fully anticipated. To deny these interconnections is both the utmost arrogance and the sheerest folly, as denial leads to delusions of full autonomy and total control, which in turn result in violence and suffering. According to ecofeminists, deep ecologists, and others, our ignorance of interdependence is the spiritual and psychological root of the current planetary ecological trauma.

Although it is in the nature of things to be embedded in complex relationships, we do not treat the things we make from nature as if that were true. Instead we say that our devices, machines, and products are “neutral,” meaning that only their use by us determines their impact and value. This claim describes a one-way relationship of complete human control over technology. Our inventions simply lay there, inert, passive, innocent, exerting no intrinsic pull or push of their own. They have somehow escaped the web of interconnection in which everything influences everything.

On one level, this makes perfect sense. Who wants a tool that bites back or heads off in unwanted directions? The ideal technology is a total slave. To the extent that it is not, that it fails to translate human will into reality, or breaks down, or demands undue maintenance, it is flawed.

The assumed neutrality of technology accounts for why, until quite recently, so little research has been done on the psychology of technology, despite the staggering influence of modern inventions. With no intrinsic influence of its own, the built world is assumed simply to reflect human psychology. It provides an elaborate stage for our personal and social dramas. But the stage itself remains a passive backdrop.

The neutrality of technology is essential to the ideal of technological progress. This ideal can be understood as a utopian vision in which humanity attains paradise by controlling nature through technology (see Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature). For this vision to be complete, nature has to be neutralized, it has to be rendered powerless and fully manipulable. Nature must also be ethically neutral, having no inherent rights or worth of its own so that humans can do what they will with the land yet remain morally upright.

For the vision of progress to hold true, technology must similarly be neutral. If it is not, if our machines change us in ways we cannot fully anticipate or control, then paradise cannot be constructed. Technology will keep pulling us in directions we did not intend or desire. And certainly technology must be ethically neutral, having no intrinsic pull of its own that moves us in directions we consider either morally desirable or repugnant.

The question of neutrality can be subtle, for technology generates temptation, and temptation is a form of influence. Even when we choose, say, to turn off our cell phone most of us still have to cope with the urge to check for messages. To resist the temptation is to interact with the intrinsic pull of the device. That is why in the gun control debate it is incorrect to assert that guns kill people and equally misleading to claim that people kill people. It is people with guns who kill people. The transaction of the individual and the weapon is at the center of this lethal process—and the gun is far from neutral.

In today’s society, exceptions to the assumption of neutrality do exist, particularly when the inherent disadvantages are obvious and severe. This is the case when the FDA determines that a drug’s “side effects” are unacceptable. For many, the intrinsic dangers of nuclear power and genetically modified organisms justify a ban. And for reasons not clear to me, since the disadvantages are often not lethal or extremely harmful, architecture is also an area where the inherent pull of the built world is readily recognized.

Thus, throughout history our dwellings have been constructed with an eye to how they move us emotionally, spiritually, and aesthetically, a set of requirements that go far beyond sheer practicality. The Taj Mahal provides a compelling example. Although cultural forces and personal differences may mold individual reactions to the marble mausoleum, it is still true that millions of people from all walks of life and from all corners of the globe respond with awe and appreciation to the spectacular edifice. Are we prepared to say that the building’s inherent properties do not contribute to this nearly universal resonance?

Critiques of Technological Neutrality


The belief in technological neutrality has, of course, been challenged elsewhere, often on a social and political basis. Although my focus here is primarily psychological, these critiques are worth briefly reviewing, for they provide a sense of the scope of the illusion of neutrality.
In Hand’s End, philosopher David Rothenberg draws our attention to how technology pulls for the creation of yet more technology:

A tool realizes a human inventor’s intention and the realization of this technique suggests new intention. Those who use the tool begin with their own intentions, and the more they accept the technology, the more their desires are changed. The technique alters its user’s grasp on the world.

Technology, notes Rothenberg, pleases us and, in so doing, seduces us down its own path. It begets more of itself through us. First the phone, then the car, then the car phone, and our concepts of communication, privacy, and travel are fundamentally altered. Rothenberg concludes:

The tool solves a problem, and then creates new and thornier issues not dreamable before. Technology, unlike science, does not even claim to reveal larger truths about what exists, but hints at more ways for humanity to change the world.

Moreover, no technology is born in a vacuum. There is always a context—social, political, economic, cultural—and it is naive to believe that the tool can be wholly extracted from its origins and applied to an unrelated situation without significantly altering that context. In In the Absence of the Sacred, Jerry Mander uses nuclear energy to illustrate this point:

Because it is so expensive and so dangerous, nuclear energy must be under the direct control of centralized financial, governmental, and military institutions. A nuclear power plant is not something that a few neighbors can get together and build … so if some future society, tiring of the present path, should determine to move away from a centralized technological society and toward, say, an agrarian society, it would be impossible. The technological elite would need to remain, if only to deal with the various wastes left behind. So it is fair to say that nuclear power inherently steers society toward greater political and financial centralization, and greater militarization.

But society’s controlling institutions do not wish to advertise the fact that so many technologies—cars, CAT scans, computers—require large institutions and centralized power to produce and maintain them. Instead, the public emphasis is always on the advantages that the latest product will confer on the individual. Mander writes:

The idea that technology is neutral is itself not neutral, since it blinds us to the ultimate direction in which we are heading and directly serves the promoters of the centralized technological pathway.

Technologies change the worlds into which they are introduced. Reality is transformed as each new wave of innovation takes hold. Neil Postman, in Technopoly, explains:

New technologies compete with old ones—for time, for attention, for money, for prestige, but mostly for dominance of the world-view. This competition is implicit once we acknowledge that a medium contains an ideological bias. And it is a fierce competition, as only ideological competitions can be. It is not merely a matter of tool against tool-the alphabet attacking ideographic writing, the printing press attacking the illuminated manuscript, the photograph attacking the art of painting, television attacking the printed word. When media make war against each other, it is a case of world-views in collision.

This collision in worldviews is dramatically illustrated when television is introduced into a culture previously untouched by it. In Ancient Futures, Helena Norberg-Hodge describes how this process unfolds in a Buddhist village in Ladakh, a sparsely populated region of India. The transformation begins almost at once. Irrespective of the content of the TV shows, the medium is inherently hypnotic. Family gatherings at night, a time when elders traditionally pass along wisdom and knowledge in the form of myths and stories, are suddenly far less interactive. People’s gaze is fixed on the TV rather than each other. Moreover, the stories told on the screen have an intrinsic quality that differs from the ambiance created by the live spoken word, the crackle of a nearby fire, the well-known gestures of an elder. Remoteness creeps in, as does an emphasis on vision and sound over touch, smell, and the immediacy of place. These changes would ensue even if the traditional cultures were to produce the TV shows for, irrespective of a show’s content, the very act of watching TV powerfully alters the viewer’s experience. In this way, television homogenizes experience. It alters any context into which it is introduced to become more like the urban-industrial context from which it arose.

In fact, technology has so altered the modern context that there is now a general belief that only through technological progress will we solve humanity’s most profound and pressing problems. Postman calls a culture steeped in such a utopian vision a “technopoly”:

Technopoly is a state of culture. It is also a state of mind. It consists in the deification of technology, which means that the culture seeks its authorization in technology, finds its satisfactions in technology, and takes its orders from technology. This requires the development of a new kind of social order, and of necessity leads to the rapid dissolution of much that is associated with traditional beliefs. Those who feel most comfortable in Technopoly are those who are convinced that technological progress is humanity’s supreme achievement and the instrument by which our most profound dilemmas may be solved.

The patterns being described here are pervasive and deep. Rothenberg alerts us to technology begetting technology, pulling its builders ever more deeply into an artificial world, mesmerizing society with its inner logic and workings. Mander brings attention to the centralization of power inherent in modern technology, a tendency that is denied by those who most benefit from it and instead touted as the empowerment of the individual. Postman sees new technologies reshaping worldviews, until a worldview emerges that deifies technology. This is not neutrality.

Stress-Inducing Technology


Neutrality has a long, honored history within psychology. Freud and his followers saw the therapist as a blank slate, an unbiased professional who could serve as a mirror to the projections, wishes, fears, and hopes of the patient. The analyst was to remove her or his own desires, impulses, and neurotic conflicts from the therapy relationship, remaining an objective observer, unaffected by the patient’s love, hate, or indifference.

"Engaging with the machines renders us impatient with the old ways," Kanner writes. "Slower rhythms are abandoned and devalued." Credit: Creative Commons/Clyde Bentley.


Just as with the idea of clinical neutrality, technological neutrality is an expression of the rational, objective, scientific ideal that dominates modern society. Moreover, it arises almost any time psychology addresses the built world. I would like to illustrate this by considering two areas in particular. The first is health psychology, which for the last several decades has been one of psychology’s fastest growing fields. The other is our relationship to the Internet, the most popular and influential of modern inventions. In both instances, we come to vastly different conclusions depending on whether we assume neutrality or explore the sway of our creations over us.

I do not own a cell phone. For many years I held out on using email until it became nearly impossible to function without it. Each time I opt out of participating in the newest phase of technological progress I have to take time with colleagues and friends to determine the best way to communicate without using the latest devices. Annoying as these negotiations sometimes are, they’ve been worth it, for the pace of my life has been slower than if I owned these recent inventions.

Which is my point. New communication technology, precisely because it is more efficient, exerts a pressure on its user to do more in a shorter period of time. In our business and personal lives, we rapidly gear up for each new communications device, as it cycles from novelty to luxury to convenience to necessity, until its efficiency becomes our own. A major, inherent pull of information technology is that our lives speed up.

Each time we communicate more efficiently, the temptation to do so grows. Each time we transmit information in seconds rather than days, the convenience, competitive advantage, and sense of control we gain invite us to do so again. Engaging with the machines renders us impatient with the old ways. Slower rhythms are abandoned and devalued. Having to wait becomes a sign of inferiority, a type of humiliation. As soon as speed becomes an advantage, not having it becomes a disadvantage.

These observations bring up a fascinating question: Could we design communication devices that encourage a variety of paces, ones more consistent with our biorhythms and those of the natural world, to which we are genetically attuned? Would such a world be emotionally and physically healthier?

In my graduate years, I was involved in creating the Daily Hassles Scale. The most frequent hassles reported were “too many responsibilities” and “not enough time,” attesting to what we referred to as “the stress of modern life.” Yet in our many discussions of this phenomenon we never mentioned the machines that lay humming away behind the scenes. We were well ensconced in the illusion of neutrality, believing people were choosing to use their new, efficient gadgets in service of a competitive, high-pressured lifestyle. They could opt to use the inventions in a more leisurely manner, or less frequently, but it was all a matter of choice. The technology, we assumed, permitted the stress of modern life but did not encourage it.

For many years I worked as a psychotherapist in Silicon Valley, the high-tech center of the world. Many of my clients were so busy that we constantly struggled to maintain a once-a-week meeting schedule. They put in twelve-to-fourteen-hour days in a chronic mode of semi-crisis, attempting to meet one deadline after another. Exhilarating and cutting-edge as their work was, it was also apparent to them that they were paying a steep price in terms of their relationships, health, and peace of mind.

Ironically, even as their lives sped up, my clients were designing and acquiring the latest “time-saving” devices. Jet lagged, they yearned for faster airplanes. Up all night and early in the morning to catch the Japanese and European business days at their inception, they touted the virtues of global communication. Devoted to technology, they continually discounted their own experience with it.

In a nutshell, information technology causes stress. When people text, instant message, and email, they are subject to a powerful pressure emanating from the equipment to be more efficient, to become more like the machine. Smart phones, iPads, and Facebook all contribute to a Type A environment that takes active effort and awareness to resist. Electronic communication is as much a reason for the deadly pace of our lives as it is a result of it.

By moving health psychology beyond the illusion of neutrality, the focus of the field shifts radically to include a careful scrutiny of the psychological environment created by modern technology. New questions appear. Perhaps the rise in cancer, heart disease, and other such illnesses of our times cannot be reversed until we engage less with stress-inducing technology. Perhaps we need to re-evaluate the movement in medicine toward sophisticated diagnostic apparatus and procedures that remove doctors even further from their patients. Perhaps a very challenging question needs to be asked: Given the accelerating stress of our current lives, are these machines worth it?

(Inter)Net Losses


Computers in particular and information technology in general are the most potent symbols of technological progress. In them are invested the dreams and hopes of the future. Many consider them the greatest manifestations to date of human intelligence and technological skill. For these reasons we are particularly attached to our screens and readily deride or dismiss their critics. Bolstered by an enormous media onslaught of support, information technology is nearly sacred.

Further, most of us have nary a clue as to how iPods, cell phones, and digital cameras work. We certainly cannot build or repair them. Instead, purchasing the latest devices allows us to identify with and in some way participate in each impressive wave of technological creativity. Possession makes us feel powerful and hip. Ownership has a potent symbolic value that extends far beyond the actual features, say, of the newest smartphone, no matter how many apps we download.

In this section, I wish to speak about the downside of information technology, especially on the psychological level, but even more about the emotional blocks we have against looking at them skeptically. Many of the claimed advantages have concomitant disadvantages, but rarely do we line up the benefits and the drawbacks, the net gains and losses, and seriously examine the whole enterprise.

One of the challenges of a relational approach to technology is becoming skilled at identifying the myriad inherent influences of each innovation. The same device or product can pull us in quite different, even opposite, directions. Hiking boots may invite us to enter the woods, at the same time luring us away from toughening the soles of our feet so we can enjoy walking barefoot in the dirt. Indeed, each technology exerts a unique set of influences on us, both desirable and undesirable. That is why it is never enough to examine only the advantages of a given innovation, no matter how appealing they may be.
Yet such a one-sided approach is typical of our analysis of information technology. This technology is supposed to grant us unprecedented power, to unleash untold creativity, to bring us all closer. With so much at stake, an unflinching look at these inventions seems prudent.

On the psychological level, information technology fosters the replacement of face-to-face contact with electronically mediated interactions. The enormity of this shift, which at times can be quite subtle, and which potentially alters our very concept of relationship, has not been adequately addressed.

Electronic communication is beginning to be experienced by many as an acceptable substitute for the physical presence of other people and for immediate engagement with one’s human and natural community. In education, we see this happening when no formal distinction is made between time spent learning on the computer and time spent learning from a human instructor. The warmth, personal understanding, and love of knowledge conveyed by a good classroom teacher are treated as interchangeable with on-line programmed lessons. Spontaneous discussions among a relatively small number of students are considered pedagogically identical to emailed questions to on-screen experts who live in different parts of the country or world and lecture to many thousands of students at once.

Educators appear to be quickly abandoning the notion that any personal relationship is necessary to learning, or learning how to think well, or learning how to apply knowledge in an ethical and compassionate manner. This seems to be the implicit assumption of supporters of MOOCs (massive open online courses), whether they see the widespread adoption of such courses as the democratization of academia—since they can be made cheaply available to large number of students—or simply as a terrific business opportunity. The solution to exorbitant higher education costs is not a technological fix that tears apart the very fabric of the teacher-student relationship and which itself is highly susceptible to commercial exploitation. The solution is to make higher education free, as we have done so successfully with kindergarten through high school.

One way to make the virtual world an acceptable substitute for the rest of reality is to romanticize the abilities of computers, which we do through the language we use to describe them. A number of authors have noted that computers do not think or have intuitions. Yet we refer to them routinely as smart or in terms of artificial intelligence. Similarly, computers are not relational—they do not bond, love, or hate. But we describe them as “interactive,” a word with strong relational connotations. Through our language, we reduce ourselves and elevate them.

People do develop some forms of meaningful relationships over the Internet. But these are quite distinct from the full-bodied ties that develop in functional families and communities. Computers numb us to the differences between virtual and real life, between cyberspace and a real place with trees and fungus and ancestors in the ground. In our adoration of these machines, and encouraged by all the media hype, we shut down the parts of ourselves sensitive to these differences.
As we use computers, it is easy to forget that they do not truly think or have creative intuitions. Instead, they calculate, perform logical operations, and follow certain algorithms or mathematical rules. In using them, we develop the cognitive skills best suited for those activities and neglect those capacities that are less well matched. We mold ourselves to the machine.

In a similar fashion, texting, e-mail and other forms of electronic communication are extraordinarily narrow. We cannot touch, smell, or directly sense the presence of others. No physical context exists beyond a lit screen. With texting, instant messaging, and other keyboard-based communication, the slower pace of exchange means spontaneity is more difficult than with the spoken word. Thus, we need to take all the splendid ways we have of connecting and cram them into these relatively barren procedures. Moreover, the more time we are immersed in an electronic medium, the easier it is to forget its limitations and instead come to believe that we are fully present. This confusion of the virtual and the real is one of the inherent qualities of information technology. As we become more interactive, we become less relational.

Technology-Tethered Teens


New forms of communication technology, of course, are particularly attractive to teenagers, for they fulfill the adolescent dream of instant access to their friends without adult supervision. Yet, as Sherry Turkle documents in her book Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other, adolescents are now reporting serious drawbacks to the heavy use of texting, instant messaging, Facebook, and the like. In Turkle’s interviews, teens describe feeling a constant pressure to respond quickly to any message, to always be “on.” They can’t ignore a text or message without risking upsetting their friends, who expect prompt replies. Turkel describes these young people as being “tethered.”

Tethered teenagers report having very little privacy. Many have gotten into the habit of instantly reporting any significant event or feeling to their peers. As a result, they fail to develop the capacity to be comfortably alone and to form a strong, independent sense of self from which to connect with others.

Although online communication appears spontaneous, in fact adolescents carefully craft the image they present to the world. They devote much time and energy to tweaking their messages in order to put their best face forward. Turkle acknowledges that conflicts around self-presentation are not new to teenagers but “what is new is living them out in public, sharing every mistake and false step.”
The availability of instant communication encourages continuous stimulation, even multi-tasking. This is another one of information technology’s inherent pulls. Teenagers now routinely augment homework with Facebook, online shopping and games, blogging, and a host of other similar activities. Yet, research indicates that multi-taskers don’t perform as well on any of their individual tasks as “single-taskers” do. In fact, the evidence indicates that multi-tasking actually interferes with learning.

Yet another problem is the constant deluge of information within which young people operate. Any message they send has to compete with many other sources of stimulation, which means it could easily get lost in the electronic shuffle.

Meanwhile, what are their parents doing? The same thing. Teenagers now complain about parental unavailability even when adults are physically present, since their parents spend large amounts of time texting or phoning. Ironically, adolescents also bemoan the loss of independence they experience because their parents can text or phone them any time, any place.

Some members of the current generation, Turkle notes,
live more than half their waking hours in virtual places. But they also talk wistfully about letters, face-to-face meetings, and the privacy of the pay phone. Tethered selves, they try to conjure a future different from the one they see coming by building on a past they never knew. In it, they have time alone, with nature, with each other, and with their families.

We could argue that these recent developments are simply a matter of teenagers choosing to use the Internet in unhealthy ways. As adults, we need to guide them (somehow) to a more reasonable approach. But the seductiveness of instant communication is a major feature of every electronic device under consideration here. Each is designed specifically to make immediate access as easy as possible. It should come as no surprise that the temptation to exploit this quality is a powerful inherent pull of the technology.

Adults, of course, are also struggling with many of the pitfalls outlined above. Neuroscientists are just beginning to address how attention, memory, and learning suffer when our digitally over-stimulated brains don’t have time to rest and recharge. In a New York Times article titled “Out of Door and Out of Reach, Studying the Brain,” Matt Richtel quotes psychologist David Strayer, professor of cognitive psychology at the University of Utah, as describing attention as the brain’s “holy grail,” noting, “Everything that you’re conscious of, everything that you let in, everything that you remember and forget, depends on it.” Too much digital stimulation, he suggests, fatigues the brain, which in turn can “take people who would be functioning O.K. and put them in a range where they’re not psychologically healthy.” The technology that has come to symbolize the peak of human intelligence could be dumbing us down.

Internet Activism Revisited


One way to remain in denial about the drawbacks of new technologies is to create a long list of the benefits and then cloak these advantages in utopian garb. This was done with radio and television, which were initially hyped as inventions that would bring the world together in harmony and peace. Now this starry-eyed promise has been transferred to information technology.

A recent example of such idealization is the use of social media and cell phones in the Egyptian uprising of 2011. The role of information technology in organizing the rebellion is seen be many, as the New York Times article “Spring Awakening: How An Egyptian Revolution Began on Facebook” described it, as the beginning of a “borderless movement that is set to continually disrupt powerful institutions, be they corporate enterprises or political regimes.”

Before crowning the Internet the grand tool of liberation, however, we need to account for the fact that computers pull for centralized power, increasing far more the influence of governments, the military, and transnational corporations than they cumulatively benefit individuals and small groups. Three questions are particularly relevant here. First, how much has the Egyptian government used the Internet to organize and implement decades of oppression? Second, how much has the Internet been used globally by governments and corporations to further oppressive policies, a question of particular relevance given recent revelations of pervasive U.S./corporate spying on citizens around the world. Third, do we truly believe that governments won’t “catch up” to techniques used in the Arab Spring and in the future shut down such efforts?

I anticipate that the answers to these questions will show that the Internet centralizes power more than it topples it. It may be necessary to use social media and cell phones to have a fighting chance against large institutions that employ the same technology on a far more massive scale, but that does not justify the glorification of these forms communication.

Resistance


There is a fierce resistance in many of us to considering even the possibility that information technology could do more harm than good. This resistance is a major concern of a relational theory of technology. As I have been suggesting, the cultural taboo against challenging technological progress cuts us off from our own experience. Instead of tolerating and exploring any discomfort we encounter with a new invention, we are far more likely to tell ourselves to adapt. When we automatically dismiss our doubts as old-fashioned we fail to distinguish between legitimate reactions to the harmful effects of technology and anxiety that arises simply because something is new and unfamiliar.

When I first wrote the precursor to this article in 1998, a friend of mine had recently brought her computer home after losing a job. The heightened activity level that it generated ruined the peaceful ambience of her small house. Her response, however, was to feel there was something wrong with her for reacting as she did. Back then, even the U. S. Senate balked at introducing laptop computers into its chambers. The senators feared that the sounds of clicking machines and the enticement of instantly available data would distract members from attending to live speeches and participating in ongoing debates. According to a San Francisco Chronicle article in September 1997, they also believed that the presence of computers would compromise the distinguished atmosphere of the proceedings. In 2013, such concerns seem quaint.

Such reactions to new technology, I suspect, are far more common than we realize, although we quickly banish them from consciousness. My friend and the senators were experiencing a healthy aversion to the intrusiveness of information technology, although we have come to experience its interference with the flow of life as normal. More generally, such negative responses are an important part of our capacity to evaluate technology.

When the Internet was first built, our society was capable of anticipating all of the problems outlined above—and a technologically wise society certainly would have done so. Based on such an analysis we might have modified the Internet before introducing it (while retaining the benefits as much as possible), limited its use once it was introduced, and monitored from the start its harmful effects. We might have decided against introducing the Internet at all.

Further, in making such decisions a peculiar quality of inventions needs to be taken into account. Once the increased convenience, power, and control of a new technology are directly experienced, and society has reorganizes itself accordingly, it is exceedingly difficult to reverse course. The “genie out of the bottle” factor is one more reason to proceed cautiously.

A Multitude of Technological Pathways


One of the key assumptions of technological progress is that advancement is linear. This simplistic model provides three choices: move forward, stand still, or regress, perhaps back to the Stone Age. The possibility that many technological pathways exist, each leading to a unique set of sophisticated inventions, does not enter the equation. The linear model also excludes the impact of culture, history, economic forces, and the like in determining which technological pathway a society follows.

Let us escape these confines for a moment by imagining we’re back in the 1940s when modern computer technology was first emerging, but living in a society far less ruled by the mind-body split than ours. In this incarnation we value emotions (body) as highly as cognitions (mind). As a result, the first modern machines designed to imitate human intelligence are built to both feel and think, however primitively. Call them “emputers,” since they emote and compute. Emputers are built to include chemical processes as well as electronic transmissions, thereby more closely paralleling the evolution of the brain than computers. They are programmed for basic pleasure and pain (like/dislike) reactions as well as “on” and “off” decisions. Over the next seven decades they take their world in a strikingly different direction than purely logical computers have taken ours.

What direction might this be? Here’s a very partial answer. In 2013, computers can defeat chess masters but cannot produce a single piece of good, let alone great, music, art, or literature. As is well known, high quality art reflects and expresses our deepest passions, fears, joys, and turmoil. Since emputers have feelings, they can begin to approximate these experiences more effectively than computers, which are left out in the cold of strict logic. Of the two types of machines, emputers could very well be the more creative.

But back to the present-day world, where the Internet is ubiquitous and, in the short term, nearly unavoidable. For many, not using it would be professional or financial suicide. Under such circumstances we can cultivate a kind of technological mindfulness and stay aware of the drastic impact that information technology is having on us collectively and individually. I have seen such awareness among many environmental activists in regard to cars. Those who own automobiles use them sparingly, buy used ones that they keep in good repair, and take public transportation whenever feasible. They are also comfortable with the idea that the personal car may eventually be relinquished, as cities are redesigned, people live close to work, and so on. They certainly don’t idolize the car as the technology of liberation. A similar approach to computers seems appropriate.

The Hands of the Spirit


Jeannette Armstrong is co-founder and director of the En’owkin School of International Writing, the first accredited Canadian writing school operated solely by and for Aboriginal people. In “Keepers of the Earth” in Ecopsychology, she shares the technological wisdom of her people, the Okanagan:

We are tiny and unknowledgeable in our individual selves, it is the whole-Earth part of us that contains immense knowledge. Over the generations of human life, we have come to discern small parts of that knowledge, and humans house this internally. The way we act in our human capacity has significant effect on the Earth because it is said that we are the hands of the spirit, in that we can fashion Earth pieces with that knowledge and therefore transform the Earth. It is our most powerful potential, and so we are told that we are responsible for the Earth. We are keepers of the Earth because we are Earth. We are old Earth.

This passage, as I have come to understand it, contains the essence of technological wisdom. Foremost, it speaks about the greater purpose of technology, providing a vision in which humanity, through its inventions, joins the Earth as the planet remolds itself. But our species participates in this mysterious unfolding in a particular manner. It seeks guidance from its world as to how to proceed. It acts as the hands of the spirit. (For those of a more atheistic bent, we could say our species acts from an ethical obligation to live in harmony with the planet, which requires continually attending to technology’s impact on nature to know if we are behaving honorably.)

According to Armstrong, our role in the planetary scheme of things has been revealed to us slowly. Over the generations, we have come to discern small parts of the greater picture. This knowledge has been acquired not just through thought, observations, logic, and experimentation—although we have learned much that way—but by listening to the “whole-Earth part of us.” In modern psychological parlance, we might speak of opening to intuition, the collective or ecological unconscious, or the transpersonal realm. Our technological potential is unfulfilled, and unfulfillable, when it is divorced from the spirit of the Earth.

Thus, the value of any technology is only partially determined by the security, comfort, and convenience it confers. We need also to know if it draws us closer to the land, to each other, and to the cosmos. These relational, political, and spiritual/ethical dimensions are always present in our inventions and are part of their inherent pull.

A significant part of this dialogue is the immediate quality of experience we have as we interact with our machines. Such exchanges cannot always be pleasant, of course, but each technology has its own look, feel, and smell, and otherwise engages our senses. It also affects our awareness of our bodies and physical surroundings—compare riding a bicycle to driving a car.

Another part of the dialogue is the pace of innovation itself, which includes the amount of time necessary to evaluate a new invention. In the case of life-altering technologies, it may take decades or even generations of observation and small-scale experimentation before we are prepared to move forward. Our species adapts quickly to change in some ways but more slowly in others. We can change our mind in an instant and acclimate to new conditions, even difficult ones, in a matter of months or a few years. However, the effects of other shifts, such as dietary ones, may not show up for decades while the full ramifications of cultural transformations, such as the scientific revolution, may not be evident for centuries. Our decisions regarding new technologies need to account for their short-term and long-term impact.

At present, much that we manufacture is, in a word, junk. As consumer society transforms into a technologically wise one, far fewer things will be made, allowing those items that remain to be of much higher quality and to be produced under considerably more favorable circumstances than the modern factory affords. People who work with wood, metal, or stone will know the local forests, caves, and mountains from which their materials come.

To move in this direction will require considerable technological creativity, integrating the old with the new, retaining all that we still value of the modern after we have come to understand far better how it molds us. This is not going back to Paleolithic modes of existence, but it is drawing on the well-established technological principles of indigenous cultures. Many of these cultures have invented successfully for thousands of years without demolishing their habitats.

Why Deal With This Now?

technology debate
The philosophy of "technological progress" has made it increasingly difficult to engage in a nuanced debate about what sort of relationship with technology would make our lives richer. Credit: 
Creative Commons/Scott McLeod.


When the opportunity arose to revise this fifteen-year-old article, I had to ask myself if it was worth the effort. Aren’t there more pressing issues than our relationship to our inventions?

As I see it, the monumental changes many envision as necessary to address the ecological crisis cannot be accomplished unless we attend to the ubiquitous influence of our machines. Let’s say, for instance, that we build a set of interlocking local economies capable of meeting most of our material needs through local production, and augmented by regional, national, and international services as needed. Within such an overarching structure, will we continue the current practice of making new, improved inventions to replace the old at an ever-accelerating rate? Even if our population plummets to 1 billion, or 500 million, do we replace our computers, cell phones, and other devices every year with better ones?

More broadly, it is entirely possible that much of modern technology moves us toward centralized power, alienation from our body, and a preference for virtual reality over physical reality. If this is the case, we dare not ignore such powerful roadblocks to a sound ecological existence.

Our species is at a technological crux, a moment when it needs to examine its ability to create as never before. Collectively, we are having a manic-depressive reaction to our inventions. On the one hand, we can but marvel with giddy anticipation as scientific and technical wizards spin out one stunning innovation after another. On the other, we are horrified with disbelief as we witness these same innovations destroying complex life on the planet. Obviously, we need to find a more even keel, an internal equilibrium in which we can fully absorb all the wonders and dangers of each invention and then decide, with full use of our rational faculties, if the gains are worth the losses. This would be the beginning of technological wisdom.

(This is a substantially revised and updated version of an article that first appeared in Revision, 20 (4), Spring 1998, pp. 45-53.)
Allen D. Kanner, Ph.D., is a cofounder of the Campaign for a Commercial-Free Childhood (commercialfreechildhood.org), co-editor of Psychology and Consumer Culture and Ecopsychology, and a Berkeley, California, child, family, and adult psychologist.
 
tags: Eco-Spirituality, Environment, technology   

Friday, October 25, 2013

"Political technology": why is it alive and flourishing in the former USSR?



"Political technology": why is it alive and flourishing in the former USSR?




Since the 1990s, post-Soviet elites have used manipulation, corruption and the government machine to maintain their grip on power. But with countries' paths diverging over time and with little opposition to speak of in many cases, Andrew Wilson asks: why is there still a need for these dark arts?
 
"Political technology" – a term largely unfamiliar in the West - is the euphemism commonly used in the former Soviet states for what is by now a highly developed industry of political manipulation. There is a general understanding that elections are fixed in most countries of the region, from Russia to Kyrgyzstan, but we still do not look closely enough at just how they are fixed.

I first sought to describe the workings of ‘political technology’ in my book Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Former Soviet World, which came out in 2005. The timing made sense. Political technology had by then helped the Kremlin achieve almost total control of the political process in Russia. The opposition was shut out of the Duma at the parliamentary elections in 2003, creating a four-party oligopoly of official Kremlin parties that more or less persists to this day.

The presidential election in 2004 represented a different type of peak of control: overwhelming victory was achieved for Putin on a target of ’70 and 70’ (vote and turnout). The high vote was achieved by ensuring that even the Kremlin parties only put forward second-string candidates to stand against Putin. High turnout was supposed to follow by forcing local authorities to act as competitive vote-farmers, but the two aims conflicted. Elections without real contestation inevitably lower public interest, forcing the Kremlin to use rising levels of ‘administrative resources’ to pad the turnout. Putin won 71.3% of the vote, but participation was a disappointing 64.3%.

The Yukos affair played a big part in both victories. It made bashing the oligarchs the main theme for the elections (the more descriptive Russian word is dramaturgiia ), and it established the Kremlin’s monopoly on manipulation. It is often said that Mikhail Khodorkovskii was arrested because he had been ‘interfering in politics’. More exactly, he had been playing the political technology game and funding everybody from Yabloko to the Communists. The rule of the game defined at the famous meeting in 2000 between Putin and oligarchs never said the oligarchs should (completely) stay out of politics: they were still required to do their share of funding the Kremlin parties (Khodorkovskii was also funding United Russia). But it was now firmly established that they should stay out of political technology.

2004, however, also marked a potential turn in the opposite direction after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, which was a protest against both crude election fraud and the manipulation techniques of political ‘technology’. There were many reasons why the Orange Revolution ended in such disappointment – but one of these was undoubtedly the fact that political technology continued to infect the system, even though the formal conduct of elections improved. Viktor Yanukovych, having failed to manipulate his way to power in 2004, ironically won a largely free and fair vote in February 2010; and has since tried to turn the clock back as far as he can go.


Vote counting in Moldova
 
 
Elections in the former USSR countries vary in their freeness and fairness. Some countries like Moldova (in picture) and Georgia are now trying to clean up their act, while the Baltic States have moved quickly towards stable political systems. Yet uses of "political technology" can be found right across the region. (Photo: Demotix / John Roshka)
 
Three sets of questions suggest themselves.  First, why does Russia still bother with political technology? Does it still need its techniques? Isn’t the Kremlin going to win elections anyway?
Second, what types of political technology were able to survive in Ukraine in the changed circumstances after 2004? Which techniques could not be used? Which have revived since 2010?
Third, how much political technology is used elsewhere in the former USSR? Some states, like the Baltic States, seem clean; but are not as perfectly clean as their image might suggest. Some are trying to clean up their act, like Moldova and Georgia; but as with Ukraine in 2005-10, the persistence of political technology reflects a deep-rooted corruption of political culture. At the other end of the spectrum are the local autocrats who are nervous that the Arab Spring will affect all dictators rather than just Muslim ones. Will they respond with liberalization or preemptive control? Political technology will obviously help with tightening the screws, but ironically it might also help with faking a more democratic facade.

Why does Russia still bother?

In Russia at least, in an atmosphere of almost complete control, most political technologists seem to have done themselves out of a job. Only a few are still connected to a very narrow circle of power.
Gasoline_prices
The dominant political party in Russia, United Russia,
is a classic "party of power". Set up to feed Putin's
dominance into the party political system, it is "dry"
and almost entirely without programme - "like
Pinocchio, it is trying to become real, but it can't".
But political technology has also been a victim of its own success. Over-control has squeezed political life out of the system, and left it brittle. The general public may not spot every trick, but they are quite rightly generally cynical that they are being conned. And puppet life is not real life: political technology can create Frankenstein’s monsters that escape the bonds of control, but mainly it creates fake dramas and inert political agents. According to one Russian practitioner, “United Russia is like Pinocchio – it is trying to become real, but it can’t. It’s trying to become a political subject, but after all, we all know that there’s only one political subject” (Putin).[1] United Russia has suffered from its lack of a real active role. It is used too much as a shield against potential challengers: it is more of a party to protect power than a party in power. There is therefore work for political technologists in cleaning up their own mess.

System maintenance
 
The first reason why political technology survives in Russia is that the system that has been built has to be maintained. First, political corpses need to be revived. The Putinist ‘Popular Front’ launched in May 2011 is an obvious attempt to refresh the jaded United Russia brand.

Second, as Graeme Robertson points out, regime supporters will be inconsistent over time. So-called ‘satellite parties’ may spin out of orbit when the regime is under pressure, as when the Polish Communists’ two tame allies, the Democrats and the United People’s Party, defected to Solidarity’s side in 1989.[2] And short of actual defection, apparently coopted parties will flirt with the real opposition when the regime is weak.
 
Conversely, previously disloyal parties or individuals may decide to win official favour, which is roughly the story of the Russian Communists since 2003.
 
 
Rodina party logo
 
 
The Kremlin's management of the party system has
looked to marginalise the genuine while retaining a
veneer of pluralism. Few projects have succeeded,
due to their artificial nature. Rodina ("Motherland") is
a case in point, having been created as a way to split
the Communist vote, but then merged into the blander
Just Russia, which itself now seems to be on the wane.
The right mixture of sticks and carrots therefore needs to be kept in place to keep regime oligopolies intact. In Russia, the Kremlin seems to have a persistent problem with the fake left; first Rodina proved impossible to control after 2003, now its successor Just Russia is trying to leech some energy from real opposition groups, but seems itself to be in decline.
 
System change

The changing balance of power within the ‘deep state’ may also lead to new projects, especially if existing formulae grow stale. Just Russia in 2007 was backed by the Russian ‘siloviki’.[3] A ‘Medvedev party’ may one day emerge, but maybe not just yet. The ‘Popular Front’ will seek to monopolise the political space to prevent rival projects emerging in the short-term – which is deeply ironic as the term was used in many Soviet Republics in the Gorbachev era to mean united opposition to the regime.

Meeting new challenges
 
The system also needs to respond to outside developments. There may be some inherent types of blowback. Robertson writes that, as with monopolies in economic theory, dominant ‘generalist’ parties like United Russia may prompt a proliferation of niche competitors. The abolition of elected governors after 2004 also means that the system has fewer lightning rods. [4] Local protests during the economic crisis have been fewer in number than many originally predicted, but have tended to have more national effect.


Vote counting in Moldova
 
 
Two sides of the remarkable Kremin-sponsored youth group, Nashi. Determined to challenge
the narrative that equated youth groups with colour revolutions, the Kremlin set up its own pro-government youth movement. It has been a recipe for some very bizarre results
 
Other challenges come of course from unforeseen events in the outside world. The first challenge to the Kremlin was already imminent in 2003-04. After the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, Kremlin political technologists, to compensate for the declining number of ‘real’ elections in Russia and for the mistakes they had made in Ukraine, developed a new brand of what they openly called ‘Counter-Revolutionary Technology’. According to Gleb Pavlovskii, organisations like Nashi were deliberately set up to ensure that ‘what happened in Georgia and Ukraine will not happen here’.[5] The election in Belarus in 2006 was used as a testing ground for neutralizing many of what the political technologists saw as the key triggers of ‘coloured revolution’: exit polls were made less effective by ‘cloning’ them with polls that echoed the official fake result, much effort went into sponsoring alternative regime-friendly NGOs and ‘ersatz social movements’.[6] Russian efforts were copied in states like Azerbaijan, where the regime also set up the youth group Ireli (‘Forward’).

The Kremlin has tried to cover all bases since the global economic crisis led to a fear of revived protest movements. Interviewed in October 2008, Gleb Pavlovskii initially talked of the likelihood of setting up a new Kremlin left party as a protest shock-absorber.[7] In 2010, however, anti-regime protest seemed more likely on the right. The Kremlin has always been more afraid of a Putin-plus force - that is, some combination of nationalism and social populism. Patriots of Russia has therefore been used as shock-absorber on the right. But the regime is increasingly also aware of its own failure to deliver on reform: there are some signs that it may wind down Just Russia and promote the right-centre project Just Cause, now headed by the billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov, as a new second string regime party instead.

One advantage of political technology is that it is ‘dry’. It helps regimes function without ideology, and move from one option to another. Ivan Krastev claims that authoritarian regimes may actually be more stable without an official ideology, which gives oppositions something to mobilise against. But, as stated above, without any real ideology political technology parties tend to be ‘dry’ too.

Meeting new challengers
 
The Kremlin maintained its four party oligopoly at the 2007 Duma elections: barriers to entry remain high. But the Kremlin also maintains an outer line of defence. Any real opposition that even gets close to challenging the 7% barrier for representation is likely to meet counter-measures.  ‘Fly’ parties that only exist to take small bites out of opposition votes have proven more, not less, important since 2003, even if they are normally on suicide missions. Projects like Civic Force and the Democratic Party (1.05% and 0.13% respectively in 2007) seem like a waste of time and money if it is assumed their mission was to win 7%, but make perfect sense if it is understood that their mission was to stop the likes of Yabloko getting anywhere near the target (it won 1.6%).

Varying the formula

Every election seems to require a new dramaturgiia, in part because voters are unlikely to be fooled by repeat tricks. The 1996 election was about bashing the Communists; in 1999-2000 it was the turn of the Chechens, followed in 2003-04 by the oligarchs. The 2007-08 elections were about Russia resurgent versus just about everybody, in order to make sake the transfer of the amorphous popularity of ‘Putin’s Plan’ to Medvedev. Arguably, one reason that earlier versions of would-be ‘parties of power’ failed in 1993 and 1995 was that they were not puffed up by an enemy to engage.

Vote counting in Moldova
 
Russian elections have to have a narrative, or "dramaturgiya", which the ruling elite ensure dominates proceedings. In 1999-2000 it was the threat posed by Chechnya, Moscow bombings and Putin's action-hero posturing. In 2003-4 it was his similarly macho attitude to the threat posed by the oligarchs, symbolised by the fall from grace of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. 
 
So by now it seems to be an established principle that all Russian elections have to have a dramaturgiia. The Kremlin doesn’t yet do routine - though Sergei Markov said as early as 2007 that ‘People are tired of being mobilized; they want to relax. That’s why they support Putin. People are tired from too many conflicts’.[8] Political technology may have an inbuilt tendency towards drama inflation, or at least towards inventing a new drama for every election, which is likely to be destabilising in the long run. The electorate can sense a lack of competition, and political technologists constantly have to fight against the declining turnout they themselves have caused – either with more drama or more fraud. At any rate, the virtual competition between Putin and Medvedev may become increasingly sharp, not just because Russia faces real choices in 2012, but to give the Russian electorate a sense through the apparent competition that there is a real struggle for their votes.

Russia’s post-modern pre-modern political culture

Russia’s ubiquitous new slogan is ‘modernisation’. But post-Soviet Russia is a curious mix of the pre-modern and the post-modern. As Richard Sakwa puts it, Russia ‘is a redevelopmental state struggling to overcome the legacy of Soviet mismodernization’.[9] Many of the political technologists’ own justifications for their trade rest on this paradox.

Sergei Markov has given a variety of explanations: ‘in Russia we had a tremendous peak in political technology in the 1990s’ (he is too modest about his own role in the early 2000s), followed by a temporary lull. But its importance was rising again. ‘In a situation when institutions are very weak, these techniques become influential. As institutions grow stronger, there will be less need for political technology. But in the world in general, institutions are becoming weaker’. ‘Public opinion is not disappearing, but it is becoming more artificially created. Political competition is increasingly a competition for the right to programme public opinion’. [10]

Markov’s colleague Gleb Pavlovskii also talks of both temporary and long-term factors: "in the 1990s you couldn’t base yourselves on social groups, you couldn’t use administrative structures. So you drew a picture". So a more stable Russia ought to have less need for political technology. But Pavlovskii also says that today ‘we live in a mythological era, where it is difficult to distinguish between myths and reality – like for the ancient Greeks – politics is not based on political knowledge, but on the myths promoted by the mass media’.[11]

The self-serving argument that Russia is no different from other post-modern political cultures where cynical manipulation is the norm implies a longer-term future for political technology. Indeed Russian practitioners would argue that it is the global norm: all politics is realpolitik, political technology also exists in the West, but we simply disguise it better – which rather downplays the extent to which they have corrupted their own system.

The Baltic States

Apart from Russia, the other former Soviet states fall into three basic categories. As the three Baltic States are now in the EU and NATO and like to think of themselves as new model Scandinavian democracies, the persistence of some types of political technology is therefore a useful reminder that they are not as clean as they would like to suggest. The Savisaar affair before the Estonian elections in March 2011 showed that covert action, subterranean party finance and the persistent use of kompromat are still features of local political culture. Local oligarchs providing opaque sponsorship to political parties remains a problem, especially in Latvia, where Andris Šķēle (People’s Party), Ainārs Šlesers (Latvia First) and Aivars Lembergs (Greens) dominated politics until the 2010 elections. Nevertheless, wholly fake parties don’t really exist in the Baltic States: they are too small and their media markets are too free.

The soft authoritarians

Most of the post-Soviet states, however, are "competitive authoritarian" regimes like Russia. Some are relatively "hard" and have little need for political technology; some are relatively "soft". Many Russian political technologists ply their trade abroad, though countries like Ukraine are joining in the export trade too.

In Belarus there were rumours before the December 2010 elections that the "grey cardinal" heads of the Presidential Administration Uladzimer Makei and Natalia Piatkevich were toying with the idea of introducing a form of controlled pluralism, with various political technology parties orbiting a new regime party "Belaya Rus". However, Lukashenka seems to fear that a regime party would be a lobby for bureaucratic interests. Hardliners like Viktar Sheiman and old-style fixers like Prime Minister Mikhail Miasnikovich were put back in charge instead, and Belarus has entered a new and unpredictable phase, with extension use of repression tearing up the previous rule of the game.
Lukashenka was lucky that his crackdown came before the Arab Spring. Elsewhere, particularly in the Caucasus and in Central Asia, regimes have to second-guess whether stability is more likely to be preserved by tightening or by loosening the screws. There are signs that regimes like Kazakhstan and possibly Azerbaijan may move towards more apparent pluralism out of nervousness at the Arab Spring – but only as an alternative to actually democratising. Limited copycat protests in spring 2011 were suppressed in Azerbaijan and in Armenia, where the commemoration of a local anniversary – the previous suppression of protests after the last rigged election in 2008 – made them more resonant.

The Orange Revolution as antidote

Aside from the Baltic States, three post-Soviet states can be considered as serious potential democracies: Georgia since 2003, Ukraine since 2004 and Moldova since 2009. But to varying degrees each is still marred by the continued use of political technology.

Ukraine was the one state where popular expectations for the eradication of political technology were high after 2004, but some practices proved harder to eradicate than others. The parliamentary elections in 2006 and 2007 were big improvements, but still not entirely free and fair. The Party of Regions in particular still benefited from its monopoly of power in "controlled regions" like the Donbas, where one study calculated they were still able to shift between 102,000 and 163,000 votes to try and benefit their Socialist allies in 2007.[12]

Fake parties and "technical candidates" ought to have disappeared, given the ‘exposure effect’ of improved media freedom, but were still around at both elections. Indeed a lot of money was wasted on such parties: including Ne Tak!, Eko+25% and Viche in 2006, and the ‘renewed’ Communists, Hromada and Regional Active in 2007. One such project was successful, however, for the former Kuchma allies and second-tier oligarchs who backed Volodymyr Lytvyn, who won 20 seats and the balance of power in parliament in 2007. But, although you could still fool some of the people some of the time, the kind of broad-based project equivalent to Russia’s Unity in 1999 was now a difficult sell in Ukraine.

However, Ukraine’s mass media, even in the orange era, was more pluralistic than it was free. Rival TV channels and papers still functioned as ‘toilet pipes’ (slivnoi bachok ). "Virtual parties" may have declined in importance, but ‘black PR’ and "kompromat wars" continued to flourish. In fact, they were arguably more virulent because leading actors were deprived of other weapons.

Moldova and Georgia have also had varying success in trying to get rid of political technology. Both are small states, which makes selling fake projects more difficult. Even under Vladimir Voronin (2001-09), the eminence gris of the ruling Moldovan Communists Mark Tkachuk concentrated on manipulating the mass media and administrative resources. Most political parties remained real. Though the use of agent provocateurs  to stage violent protests as an excuse to hold on to power after the elections in April 2009 was a classic political technology ploy.

Georgia under Shevardadze saw several minor parties secretly backed by oligarchic and Russian money. Georgia under Saakashvili has a hegemonic ruling party, but has specialised in black PR and the selective use of the tax police to harass political opponents. Even after 2009, Moldova’s judiciary remains an "administrative resource" and party labels still disguise business groups seeking to colonise the state.

Ukraine revives political technology under Yanukovych     
   
Ukraine under Yanukovych may be dismantling democracy, but it is unlikely to move towards full-blooded authoritarianism. It is restoring political technology where it can instead.

The first step was the revival of "administrative resources" in the local elections in October 2010. The opportunities for direct ballot stuffing were limited, so the authorities used "legal technologies" to prevent the opposition registering in many localities and setting up fake "clone" branches instead.
But the main opposition Tymoshenko Block still secured second place in the elections. Constant legal harassment and the luring away of business supporters have weakened but not destroyed it. One faction in the regime sought to up the ante against the opposition when formal charges were laid against Tymoshenko in May 2011. Another has promoted satellite parties to try and replace it. Oligarchs close to the regime have covertly financed the ultra-nationalist party Svoboda ("Freedom"), which also serves as a "scarecrow" - a chimerical "worse alternative" to the current authorities; but recent polls have shown Svoboda reaching a ceiling (3.1%). In Ukraine the potential audience for a radical right-populist party may have grown during the economic crisis, but is historically limited to radical fringes in western regions. The idea that Svoboda’s leader Oleh Tiahnybok could serve as an easily defeatable opponent for Yanukovych in a second round presidential election instead of Tymoshenko is fanciful (though it has been mooted); but his party could still help divide the opposition vote at the parliamentary elections due in 2012.

So regime technologists are toying with the idea of copying the Russian strategy of having two official "regime parties" instead. Though Ukrainian circumstances imply a different division of labour to Russia, where Just Russia is "to the left" of the catch-all party United Russia. In Ukraine, the Party of Regions’ electorate in south-east Ukraine is largely left-of-centre: a second regime party might therefore either be quasi-liberal or quasi-rightist, to undercut the Tymoshenko Block in western and central Ukraine.

The original candidate for the second party in 2010 was Serhii Tihipko’s Strong Ukraine; but Deputy Prime Minister Tihipko was handed responsibility for tax and then pension reform, alienating his natural supporters. He also suffered simply because he was in government. Polling by the Razumkov Centre in April 2011 showed support for Strong Ukraine dropping sharply to 4.9%: although the Front for Change fronted by another regime-friendly politician Arsenii Yatseniuk had risen to a respectable if not decisive 8.1%, so the second party idea could be revived or transferred to another, newer project.

One final trick may be to exploit new parties like Udar! ("Punch!") headed by the popular boxer Vitalii Klychko. The Party of Regions has not obstructed its recent rise in the polls (to 3.2%), as the party could be used for "parachutists": i.e. some current Party of Regions MPs could be placed on its election list, if Regions drops further in the opinion polls.

Political technology: here to stay in soft authoritarian states
The politics of deception ought to be a passing phenomenon. Post-Soviet voters are rightly cynical that they are so often tricked or fooled, so political technologists tend not to use the same trick twice (except when they sell cheap repeat performances to clients in other countries). But political technology is what makes ‘soft authoritarianism’ in states like Russia soft, and the Kremlin is likely to continue to prefer it to full-blown authoritarianism. The deterioration of democracy in Ukraine also increases the scope for its use. Elsewhere, the Arab Spring is likely to prompt nervous regimes towards the imitation of democracy rather than real democracy. Political technology is therefore likely to remain a feature of post-Soviet politics for the foreseeable future.


[1] ECFR interview, Moscow May 2011.
[2] Graeme B. Robertson, The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes. Managing Dissent in Post-Communist Russia , (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 164-6.
[3] Luke March, ‘Managing Opposition in a Hybrid Regime: Just Russia and Parastatal Opposition’, Slavic Review , vol. 68, no. 3 (Fall 2009), pp. 504-27.
[4] Robertson, The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes , as above.
[5] Author’s interview with Gleb Pavlovskii, Moscow, 19 December 2007.
[6] Robertson, The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes , pp. 192-7.
[7] Author’s interview with Gleb Pavlovskii, Moscow, 20 October 2008.
[8] Author’s interview with Sergei Markov, Moscow, 19 December 2007.
[9] Richard Sakwa, The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dual State, Factionalism and the Medvedev Succession , (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 57.
[10] Author’s interview with Sergei Markov, Moscow, 19 December 2007.
[11] Author’s interview with Gleb Pavlovskii, Moscow, 19 December 2007.
[12] Mikhail Myagkov, Peter C. Ordeshook and Dmitri Shakin, The Forensics of Election Fraud: Russia and Ukraine , (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 219.

Why the Government Never Gets Tech Right




Op-Ed Contributors

Why the Government Never Gets Tech Right

Getting to the Bottom of HealthCare.gov’s Flop


 Published: October 24, 2013


MILLIONS of Americans negotiating America’s health care system know all too well what the waiting room of a doctor’s office looks like. Now, thanks to HealthCare.gov, they know what a “virtual waiting room” looks like, too. Nearly 20 million Americans, in fact, have visited the Web site since it opened three weeks ago, but only about 500,000 managed to complete applications for insurance coverage. And an even smaller subset of those applicants actually obtained coverage.

For the first time in history, a president has had to stand in the Rose Garden to apologize for a broken Web site. But HealthCare.gov is only the latest episode in a string of information technology debacles by the federal government. Indeed, according to the research firm the Standish Group, 94 percent of large federal information technology projects over the past 10 years were unsuccessful — more than half were delayed, over budget, or didn’t meet user expectations, and 41.4 percent failed completely.
       
For example, Sam.gov, a system for government contractors developed by I.B.M. that started in 2012, has cost taxpayers $181 million and is just now beginning to work as expected. Before that, a new version of USAJobs.gov landed with a thud, after years during which millions were spent. In 2001, the F.B.I. started a virtual case file system, and after dumping the project, renaming it, and finding new vendors to build it, the project, “Sentinel,” managed to see the light of day just last year.
       
Clearly, these failures — though they are not as well known to the public — extend far beyond Barack Obama’s presidency. But this latest stings more than the others. Perhaps that’s because it comes from a president who is seen as a transformational figure, who has had to watch his signature achievement be held hostage by that most banal of captors: a clunky computer system.
      
So why is it that the technology available to Mr. Obama as president doesn’t compare to the technology he used to win an election? Much of the problem has to do with the way the government buys things. The government has to follow a code called the Federal Acquisition Regulation, which is more than 1,800 pages of legalese that all but ensure that the companies that win government contracts, like the ones put out to build HealthCare.gov, are those that can navigate the regulations best, but not necessarily do the best job. That’s evidenced by yesterday’s Congressional testimony by the largest of the vendors, CGI Federal, which blamed everyone but itself when asked to explain the botched rollout of the new Web site.
      
But maybe there’s hope. In 2004, campaign contracting was a lot like government contracting is today: full of large, entrenched vendors providing subpar services. Howard Dean changed that by reaching out to a new breed of Internet-savvy companies and staffers (including one of us). In 2012, Barack Obama beat Mitt Romney thanks in part to a mix of private-sector-trained technology workers and a well-developed ecosystem of technologies available from competitive consultants.
      
This latest failure is frustrating for us to watch. Our careers have largely been about developing technology that allows more people to participate in the way we finance, support and elect candidates for public office. Together, we’ve done things that transformed elections, but we now need that work to carry into transforming government.
      
Government should be as participatory and as interactive with its citizens as our political process is. A digital candidate will never be able to become a digital president if he can’t bring the innovation that helped him win election into the Oval Office to help him govern.
      
HealthCare.gov needs to be fixed. We believe that in a few days it will be. As Mr. Obama said last week after the government shutdown ended, “There’s no good reason why we can’t govern responsibly, despite our differences, without lurching from manufactured crisis to manufactured crisis.” There’s no good reason we can’t code responsibly, either. We must find a fix to the federal procurement process that spares the government’s technology projects from the self-inflicted wounds of signing big contracts whose terms repeatedly and spectacularly go unmet.
      
The good news is that these problems are not unique to the United States government, and others already have solutions. In 2011, the British government formed a new unit of its Cabinet Office called the Government Digital Service. It’s a team of internal technologists whose job it is to either build the right technology, or find the right vendors for every need across the government. It gives the government a technical brain. It has saved the country millions, and improved the way the government delivers services online.
      
The United States has taken a step in this direction. Last year, the government’s chief technology officer, Todd Park, started the Presidential Innovation Fellows program and brought together innovators from across the country to work on hard technical problems inside of government. But we need to create our own Government Digital Service.
      
The president should use the power of the White House to end all large information technology purchases, and instead give his administration’s accomplished technologists the ability to work with agencies to make the right decisions, increase adoption of modern, incremental software development practices, like a popular one called Agile, already used in the private sector, and work with the Small Business Administration and the General Services Administration to make it easy for small businesses to contract with the government.
      
Large federal information technology purchases have to end. Any methodology with a 94 percent chance of failure or delay, which costs taxpayers billions of dollars, doesn’t belong in a 21st-century government.



Clay Johnson, a former Presidential Innovation Fellow and lead programmer for Howard Dean’s 2004 campaign, is the chief executive officer of the Department of Better Technology, a nonprofit that develops technology for governments. Harper Reed is the former chief technology officer of Obama for America.